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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the Cold War naval procurement for the US
Navy has seen a dramatic decrease. This decrease in defense
spending has placed existing programs under more scrutiny
than previous years. As a result there is less tolerance on
the part of taxpayers and Congress for procurement cost
growth. This Thesis attempts to examine the current method
that the Navy conducts ship cost estimates and suggests
changes in order to improve the confidence level and
accuracy of the forecasts. An examination of how industry
is conducting cost estimates was used as a comparison to
the current Navy practices. Finally using only a weight
based approach to ship cost estimating is insufficient. It
is necessary to develop and use a model that incorporates
other cost driving factors in order to develop estimates of
sufficient quality at the preliminary design level.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end
Navy has seen
spending has
than previous
the part of
growth.
of the Cold War naval procurement for the US
a dramatic decrease. This decrease in defense
placed existing programs under more scrutiny
years. As a result there is less tolerance on
taxpayers and Congress for procurement cost
Government and especially the Navy have been known to take
conservative steps when determining whether they need a re-
evaluation of their practices. Ship cost estimating has
evolved in industry to include new production processes and
developments since the 80's. The Navy has not. As a result
the Navy is estimating the cost of ships using processes
that are part of the past during an era where vessels were
being built at a much higher rate with less need for
transparency and cost cutting.
An ability to perform effective, detailed, and reliable
ship cost estimating could finally create a change in the
way the Navy is able to negotiate its contracts. A greater
understanding of the factors that drive costs can hopefully
lead to a decrease in cost overruns for two reasons: First
7
designers will be in a better position to quickly perform
trade off studies and therefore develop a better
understanding of how their designs affect cost. Second,
with an ability to perform reliable cost estimates at the
preliminary level, the Navy will be able to negotiate more
favorable contract terms that could decrease costs.
In the past the Navy has used a weight based model to
estimate costs. It has been shown that this is not a good
and reliable method for estimating costs since weight is
not the only factor driving costs. Thus this thesis
attempts to examine how the Navy conducts its estimates and
the limitations of the current method. Furthermore an
examination of current industry ship cost estimating
practices has been included suggesting ways that the Navy
could improve its current models and practices. The MIT
ship cost estimating model has been examined in order to
determine its capabilities in estimating ship construction
and life cycle costs. Finally some suggestions for
decreasing ship construction costs have been included.
8
CHAPTER 1 - OVERVIEW OF US NAVY:
The US Navy, which is currently comprised of 283 vessels,
is the most technologically advanced Navy in the world. The
US government assigns a sizable amount of its budget each
year to maintain this superiority. The president's budget
for the US Navy for the year 2006 amounted to $133 billion.
The projected increase for the budget in 2007 will be $4.4
billion. In 2005, the Navy devoted $7.6 billion to new ship
construction projects of which 96% was allocated between
four classes: the Arleigh Burke Class destroyer, the Nimitz
Class aircraft carrier, the San Antonio Class amphibious
transport dock ship, and the Virginia Class submarine.
Procurement cost growth in naval construction programs has
been a longstanding problem that has plagued Navy officials
and Members of Congress. Admiral Vernon Clark, Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), has expressed strong concern, if
not outright frustration about the matter (7). Combined
with the rising procurement costs, the Navy is also facing
reduced budgetary constraints on ship procurement funding.
The 2006 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1815) as reported
by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 109-89)
contains provisions that establish procurement cost caps on
9
several Navy shipbuilding programs, direct the Navy to
begin developing a lower cost destroyer, a lower cost
nuclear-powered submarine, and create a new program for US
shipyards aimed in part at improving the efficiency and
cost effectiveness of the construction of Navy ships (7).
In order to fund cost overruns in its ship construction
programs, the Navy has had to resort to "prior year
completion" funding. This is essentially additional
appropriations for vessels already under contract. Congress
appropriated funds to cover a $2.1 billion increase in ship
budget requirements for vessels that are currently more
than 30% complete. The total appropriations are expected to
surpass $3 billion by the time all vessels are complete
since the cost estimates assume that shipyards will
maintain current efficiencies and meet all their
milestones. This would correspond to a cost increase range
of 12% to 17% of the initial contract price (Figure 1).
Over the past 5 years, about 10% of the Navy's ship
construction budget of $52 billion has paid for cost growth
for ships funded in prior years. The implication of these
cost overruns is that it reduces the buying power of the
budget for current construction and reduces the rate of
modernization of the Navy.
10
Table 3: Growth in Program Budgets for Case Study Ships
Dollars in millions
Initial and fiscal year 2005 President's
budget Difference in budgets
Difference due to Difference due to
Navy-furnished construction
Case study ship Initial' FY2005 Total difference equipment costs
DDG 91 $917 $997 S80 $43 $37
DDG 92 925 979 55 (7) 62
CVN 76 4.476 4,600 124 (128:' 252
CVN 77 4.975 5,024 49 100 (51:
LPD 17 954 1,758 804 21 734
LPD 18 762 1,011 249 3 246
SSN 774 3.260 3,682 422 95 327
SSN 775 2.192 2,504 312 18 294
Total 18.461 20.556 2.095 145 1.951
S,:uron: New Gdai, O prfrafildcsi.
'Estimated cost from the President's tudget submission for year of ship authorization.
'Includes all prior year requests through fiscal year 2005.
'Part of increased cost Is due to changes in the scop of tie contract.
'Negative reflects savings resulting from th. use of a more economical warfare system than was
initially budgeted on the DDG 92.
'Negatlve reflects savings garnered from Navy-furnished reactor plant equipment.
'Negative reflects shifting of funds f rom the construction contract to Navy-fumished equipnent.
Figure 1. Growth in Program Budget (4)
Reasons for Cost Overruns:
New production technologies and organizational improvements
in shipyards have resulted in a continuous reduction in
manhours/tonne over time. If time spent in dock is
decreasing, then why is cost continuing to rise (Figure 2)?
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Figure 2. Shipyard Cost and Productivity (24)
1. Types of Shipbuilding Contracts
The nature of the shipping business in general lends itself
to situations that place an excessive difficulty to
effective cost estimation even to the most experienced ship
cost estimator. Ship contracting is still at a time where
it takes 9-14 years for a new class of surface combatants
to be developed from concept design to delivery, when at
the same time new technologies have a 3-5 year life cycle.
It is therefore imperative to design vessels with a focus
on technological convertibility. Figure 3 shows typical
production times for various weapon systems.
12
Figure 1: Typical Production Tlmes for Various Weapon Sysrna
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Figure 3. Typical Weapons Systems Production Times (4)
In most cases ship construction contracts are being agreed
upon without the completion of detailed design. The reason
for this is that detailed designs with a detailed cost
estimate are very expensive and excessively time consuming.
Shipyard work in terms of work specification is difficult
to formalize and predict directly from intricate detailed
ship designs. This presents a very large risk to both the
buyer who might end up overpaying for a vessel and the
seller who might have to incur exorbitant costs due to the
lack of clear definition of the work at hand.
Two types of contracts have emerged that try to deal with
the difficulty that naval acquisitions present to all
parties involved in the transaction. The first is fixed
13
price contracts. In this case the price is pre-arranged and
agreed upon by both parties. Adjustments can be made in
some cases but there is a definite ceiling price that if
the shipyard surpasses, it agrees to pay all additional
costs. The second is method is cost reimbursement
contracts. The contract forces the government to pay all
additional costs of completing a vessel if the shipyard can
prove that the incurred costs were unavoidable. Generally
cost reimbursement contracts are used for the lead ship and
the fixed price contracts are used for the following
vessels in the class due to the large amount of uncertainty
present in a lead ship acquisition.
The contracts themselves however are not so clearly
defined. They both have provisions that attempt to control
cost and profit. These are called incentive fees. The
shipbuilder and the Navy share the savings if the final
cost is less than the estimated target, and they share the
cost when the price exceeds the target. This process
attempts to provide incentives for both parties to do their
jobs efficiently. Either way, both contracts place an
absolute emphasis on the need for a reliable cost estimate.
Due to the absence of an effective cost estimating
methodology, the contracts that are being used inherently
14
create ways to force the buyer (in this case the Navy) to
incur the major cost of overruns.
2. Labor and Materials Cost
Figure 4 shows the breakdown of the components of cost
growth. It is apparently clear that labor and material
surcharges which account for 78% of cost overruns are the
leading cost burden that the US Navy has to manage.
Figure 2: Components of Cost Growth
7< 5%
17% Overhead rate and labor rate increases
40%
38 . -e Material increases
Labor hour increases
Percentage of cveral lot grwth due to shipbuilde construction costs
Percentage of ontraiccet r th due bo cost of Navy-turnished equipment
Otu ct pcriudor ana~ dflS a; '.. 'anotonto.
Note: Tutal growth in constructic -costs is $3.2 billion. based on shipbuilders' esimte at completion.
Figure 4. Components of US Navy Cost Growth (4)
For the vessels that were examined by GAO, the total cost
growth due to increased labor hours totaled more than $1.3
billion. The main reasons for the cost growth can be seen
in Figure 5. The repeated issue causing the delays was
determined to be the lack of maturity of the design which
directly led to rework. Examples of such issues include the
LPD 17 where construction began as the design of the vessel
15
continued to evolve. The vessel has faced the largest cost
increases of all the vessels due to this fact. The DDG 91
and 92 suffered from severe reworking and delays due to the
installation of the remote minehunting system which was a
technology not fully developed at the time.
Table 6: Reasons Given by Shipbuilder for Labor Hours Cost Growth
Case study ship Reasons for increase
DD& 91 . Inesperienced laborers
- Design upgrades that reed Iin reowcrk
DDG 92 . Intrcduclion of a new construction facelity, setfng workers
back on the learning curve
. Design upgrades that read tin reswk and -.*karunds
* Strike increased number of hours needed to constfuct ship
CV N 76 . Less-skilled workers due to demands ltr le;r on other
prcq raim at shipyard
. Extensive use ot cverfi-m
. Design changes resulting in rework
CVN 77 . Late material delivery results in delays ard workarourds
. Design chamnge resulting n rework
LPD 1 . Inexpertenced subt.ontracted lab:.r
. Design difficulties led to doing wck out of sequence and
rework
. &hedule delays
* Bused workers to meet latr shortages
LPD 18 . Increases in LPD 1 translated into more hours for LPD 1
SSN 774 . Late matenal delrvery
. First in class design issues
SSN 775 . Quality prblems and design changes
. Incluskn of rcn-recurring labor hours
sau Empiu~r ianaso a0 nu
Figure 5. Reasons for Shipyard Labor Hours Growth (4)
Overhead costs include a wide variety of costs incurred in
the operation of the shipyard which are not directly
chargeable to particular ship contracts. The overwhelming
majority of overhead costs are time related. This leads to
an understanding that by reducing construction time there
are significant benefits, even if labor manhours don't
decrease. The increased cost growth relating to overhead
costs in this case are attributed to the decreased workload
16
that US shipyards are facing which would absorb some of the
operating costs.
Navy furnished equipment refers to the costs for
technologies and equipment that the Navy purchases and has
installed. Such equipment typically accounts for about 30%
of the total budget for recent vessels. The growth of this
significant cost sector has remained relatively low at 5%
(Figure 4) . The reasons for this is that the Navy benefits
from economies of scale due to the affordability through
commonality approach that it is beginning to use when
procuring equipment in bulk. The Navy is however still far
from creating an organized trans-vessel class commonality
approach to its equipment acquisitions.
3. Underbudgeting and Price Increases
Underbudgeting and price increases have dramatically
increased the levels of material cost growth. For the San
Antonio, Nimitz, and Virginia class vessels, material cost
was the most significant component of cost growth (Figure
6) . DDG 91 had $22 million in material cost savings due to
consolidation of Ingalls Shipyard with Avondale Shipyard
under Northrop Grumman. Therefore materials were purchased
17
for four ships at one time leading to a price decrease due
to economies of scale.
Tab Is7: Growth in Material Costs
Dollers in millions
Ar"Oys tased.:n data availelIe J ULy 2i4
Total dollars due to Material cost as a percent of
Case study ship increased material costs Percent increase total contract growth
DDG 91 (S22) (3% (40,
DDG 92 30 20 23
CVN 76 294 43 46
cVN 77 34 13 31
LPE 17 0 iCG 47
LPC 18 93 39 24
SSN 774 141 43 49
SSN 775 209 56 49
Total $1.210 38%
UNSu sM : G1c ympe5
Note W4 cicnpar-d WHOl target i6I b3 the uIrEnt - -te at -xipietion ic .dt-4fline total c>:inat
.>>st grcK*Ih. 0:t jrvJP:th wj tb due to Navy chanrge6 I rlract so:p. nShOullde per ntcnCA O . -.
unanicipabed oevnis.
Figure 6. Growth in Material Costs (4)
The reasons for these cost increases rely heavily on the
quality of the budget of the materials and the way the
contracts are formulated. The first four Virginia class
submarines' materials cost budget was $132 million lower
than actual price quotes that were received by vendors and
subcontractors. For the Nimitz class aircraft carriers, the
materials cost budget was based on an incomplete materials
list. Why? The reason again lies in the types of contract
that are negotiated between the shipyards and the Navy.
Since shipyards know that they will be reimbursed for
change orders in contracts or price increases for high
value specialized items, they underbudget their cost
18
forecasts, win the contract to build and then simply pass
on the higher cost back to the Navy.
Price increases of materials is another significant
component of material cost growth. Factors that affect
price increase are more than just national inflation
levels. Inflation itself is an average number of a range of
products that do not directly display the price increases
that are faced by the naval construction industry. Changes
in the supplier base since the end of the cold war due to
the subsequent decreasing rate of ship production has
resulted in industry consolidation. A lower number of
suppliers has resulted in a lack of competition between
subcontractors and a consequent increase in price. Over 75%
of the ship material contracts for the Virginia class
submarines have been from single source vendors. While on
the LPD 17, the increase in cost of the subcontractors
accounted for 70% of the increase in material costs (4).
19
CHAPTER 2 - COST ESTIMATION:
The cost of a vessel is the sum of all the labor and
materials costs involved in the construction including any
overhead costs. The final price of a vessel will include
allowances for capital cost financing, inflation, and
shipyard profit. Due to the particular nature of the
shipbuilding industry and the high degree of variation
between particular projects, the necessity of reasonably
correct cost estimations is imperative. The complexity and
cost of detailed ship design and the length of time between
preliminary design and completion are the leading factors
that determine the flexibility of contract between the Navy
and the shipyard. This inherent flexibility and lack of
definition is the leading cause for the increasing number
of design change orders and final price escalation costs.
Figure 7 shows a typical project timeline.
c:plete
Cnt:jct P..ans r-=t r aci
7Cam r je T lne ( Io)
I I, I n, t1
Figure 7. Typical Project Timeline (1)
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Historically designers and shipyards have been able to
categorize costs by consistent work breakdown structure
such as hull structure, outfit, machinery, piping,
electrical. Hull Structure is priced on hull weight and
material type. More developed systems segregate different
sections of the hull and develop different costs according
to the production difficulty of the section. Major
equipment is directly priced from the vendor. Other outfit
systems are generally priced through parametric analysis
and extrapolated historical data for the construction and
installation of the system.
Cost estimates are required at all stages of design
development. The importance of a good cost estimate
particularly at the early levels of design can be crucial
when comparing different design proposals. It is very easy
to manipulate early cost estimating programs that use basic
parameters as a basis and criteria for determining cost.
The different types of cost estimates can be broken down
into three general groups relating to stage of design: 1)
Concept Design, 2) Preliminary Design, 3) Detailed Contract
Design. Figure 8 shows a comparative cost comparison as the
breadth and scope of each stage of cost estimation changes.
21
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Figure 8. Cost of Scope of Various Cost Estimations (1)
A detailed explanation of each cost estimate according to
stage will be presented in the following section. Figure 9
shows how cost analysis in the early design stages is in
the enviable position of applying maximum effect for
minimum cost (relative to project cost). Possible cost
savings decrease dramatically as the project is defined
more clearly. This relationship is particularly applicable
with the introduction of advanced technologies in ship
design. The greatest savings result from the introduction
of innovations at the early stages of development.
Incorporating new technologies at later stages when the
design is already committed to a certain technology will
result in increased labor costs and change orders.
22
CUMULATIVE SYSTEM PROGRAM COST
COMMITMENT DECISIONS
COST-
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Less Then, 5% Program 10-95% of total Prograrn
Figure 9. Cost of Design Change (1)
In the Concept Design stage, the purpose of the cost
estimate is to create a very rough order of magnitude (ROM)
cost estimate. At this stage basic ship type and parameters
are presented and the mission and operational requirements
are broadly defined. The cost estimate is used as a
feasibility check on the project. At this stage the cost
estimate is based on historically extrapolated data and
basic parametric analysis.
The Preliminary Design stage is a very crucial design
stage. At this phase, the methodology and validity of the
cost estimate is imperative since it is at this point where
the design will be evaluated against other options. It is
23
therefore important for the designer to understand how his
decisions will affect cost since major tradeoff studies are
performed and major decisions about the future of the
project will be made. This is a very powerful and exciting
time of the design process, but also one that requires
careful decisions and thorough understanding of the cost
implications of each design choice. The two necessary
components that must be addressed at this stage are: the
initial capital cost for the construction of the vessel,
and the net present value of the operating costs discounted
throughout the life of the vessel.
The cost estimating methodology used at this preliminary
stage depends on the type of project underway. If the
vessel designed is radically different from all past
designs using new technologies, new equipment, and
composite materials, then the difficulty of making a
realistic and reliable estimate will be compounded. This is
because of the four main types of cost estimating methods
that are available at this stage: 1) Analogy, 2)
Parametric, 3) Extrapolation, 4) Expert Opinion.
The Analogy type uses a direct comparison between two
similar systems. It is used in early stages of design and
24
is inherently historically based. Its inability to account
for new features and changes in productibility due to labor
learning rate are its major flaws.
Parametric estimates base their predictions on design
parameters such as ship size, weight, horsepower, etc. Such
analyses use a mathematical relationship between input
parameter and cost that is historically determined through
regression analysis (i.e. Cost = f*(weight)). The cost
estimator using this system must be knowledgeable enough to
know when an adjustment factor is needed, and to know what
the factor should be.
Extrapolation methods can only be used when there are
return costs available for similar systems used in prior
vessels (adjusting for inflation). The accuracy of the
system is a function of the length of the extrapolation and
the consistency of the factor being extrapolated. They
should only be used if the project has progressed to such a
level of definition. In the case of new technologies this
type of methodology is difficult to assume.
Expert opinion can prove to be very effective but it can
also be misleading. Personal involvement in projects
25
carries with it the agenda that each person wants to
follow. A person's occupation and position influences the
forecast. Low estimates are generated by persons whose
interests are served by low estimates. Examples could be
the vessel designers, shipyards, subcontractors, and
material vendors who want the vessel to be built.
Similarly, high estimates are generated by persons whose
interest is served by high estimates. In this case it could
be the government cost estimator who does not want to be
scrutinized by his superiors or some Congressional
Committee when it turns out the project requires additional
funds.
The value of an experienced cost estimator is that he has a
better understanding of which particular CER is applicable
to each situation. Since most CER's include empirically
derived factors, it is necessary to have them used by
someone who appreciates and understands their implications.
This is particularly important if the new design uses new
technologies which have not been used in the past.
Furthermore, expert opinion is very useful in providing a
rational crosscheck of the data that modern, complex,
general, computer generated equations produce. It is
therefore the appropriate combination of the value of
26
judgment provided by the expert used in conjunction with
estimating relationships that can result in better
forecasts. A summary of the effectiveness of various types
of cost estimates is shown in Figure 10.
ABILITY ABILITY
TO TO DATA WORK
TYPE OF COST REFLECT REFLECT BASE WITH
ESTIMATE PRECISION COST TIME PROD'TN DESIGN COST PODAC
CHANGES CHANGES
Parametric Fair Low Quick Requires Requires Some New
Factor Factor Work
I Req'd
Engineering High Very Slow Yes Yes Large Yes
Large II
Analog (Comparison) Fair/Good Medium Modente Requires Yes Some New
Factor Wok
Req'd
Extrapolation Fair Low Quick Requires Requires Some New
Factor Factor Wouk
Red
Expert Opinion Fair-Low Low Modeate Possibly Possibly Low Possible
Performance Based Unknown Low Quick Requires Possibly Some Unknown
__________ 
______ 
___ I__ Factor
Re-use/Module High Low- Quick- Yes Yes Irp Yes
Medium Moderate . _Startup
Figure 10. Comparison of Cost Estimates (25)
The final design stage before the project moves into
construction is the Detailed Contract Design stage. In this
phase the engineering methodology is used to determine
costs. It is a timely, expensive and tedious process based
on a detailed "bottom up" accounting of the required work
and materials used to construct the ship. It is however,
the most accurate method available. The costing information
at this level of design provides the fundamental basis for
27
the contract price rather than to create a design trade off
analysis. The final technique that can be implemented is
the introduction of re-use modules. This is a method that
requires a strong detailed design structure that can
formulate and categorize the vessel into modules and re-use
elements. There are indications however that the Navy is
moving towards a modularized production oriented approach
to design. This will be discussed further in the following
sections.
The difficulty of assigning an assumed final cost to a
product 3 to 7 years before its materialization is logical;
however, it is necessary to understand the factors that
could result in cost changes in order to develop better
methods of analysis to deal with them:
1. Technology Change
" New processes
" New materials
2. Social, Economic, and Political Situation
* Changing workforce
* Economic downturn and unrest
3. Shipyard Backlog
0 Heavy backlog causes confusion
28
0 Few orders results in loss of learning
4. Labor Rates
0 Different for each shipyard
0 Unpredictable changes
5. Material Costs
* Vendor base changes
" Delayed shipments
6. Regulatory Structure
0 New rules
7. Inflation
* Fluctuates unpredictably
* Different rate for each item
The new cost estimating systems that industry and the Navy
are developing are currently trying to incorporate factors
that will deal with these issues that distort parameter
estimates. One of the most important additions to the new
system (discussed in Chapter 5) will be the uncertainty
analysis which will assign a certain probabilistic
distribution to each parametric regression equation (Figure
11). This will provide cost estimates with a certain range
of probable outcomes. In this way it will be easier for the
29
Navy to plan and manage the level of risk associated with
each project.
Figure 12. Addition of Risk in CER's (1)
Since cost estimates are often required well in advance of
the contract design phase, the US Navy developed a method
which is based on a single common parameter: weight. The
basic construction cost of a ship is then directly
determined, through the use of historically determined
factors. These form cost estimating relationships (CER's)
that are used to provide parametric analysis of ship
construction costs. This method uses the Ship Work
Breakdown Structure (SWBS) as a common means of
communicating the level of technical definition between the
designer, shipyard and cost estimator. Its definition
varies in depth and breadth as a project moves through each
design phase. The main components that make up the one
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digit SWBS group system are shown in Figure 13. The total
weight of the ship is the sum of groups 100 through 700.
Figure 13. One Digit SWBS Breakdown (1)
As the level of design increases, so does the level of
group specification within the system. For example, a two
digit weight group such as group 130 defines hull decks. On
the three digit level, group 132 could be second deck.
Engineers like using this type of classification system
because it is system based. It is good for early stages of
design and it lends itself to parametric extrapolation or
analogy cost estimating methods.
Such an approach which results in a heavy reliance on
weight as the surrogate of costs can be deceiving.
Experience has shown that there are cost drivers other than
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SWBS Group Description
100 Hull Structure
200 Propulsion Plant
300 Electric PIlant
400 Command & Sur vwi ance
500 Auxiliary SyStwms
600 Out4it & FarnishingS
700 Armament
800 Design & Cnqgn*rirnq Sev~iceu
900 construction Services
weight that cannot be ignored. The DDG51 suffered from
severe operational issues due to the use of a solely weight
based cost estimate method. Designers believed that
decreasing the beam by 2ft would decrease costs. The
construction difficulty factor however, increased to such a
level that the overall cost of the ship increased. Also
operational issues arose due to the change since stretchers
couldn't fit in the 2ft narrower corridors.
Another issue with the SWBS classification is that it is
system based rather than production based. The current
system ignores the possibility of production friendly
designs which would reduce costs. This is an issue that
arises when designers try to optimize one aspect or system
rather than the efficient production of the vessel as a
whole. Figure 14 shows the effect of increasing the deck
height of the DDG51 from 9ft to 11'2". Since 6'5" is
required for access of personnel, the DDG51 had only 2'7"
available for distributive systems. This led to congested
overheads, costly and difficult installation due to
structural member penetration and the deviation from
optimum pipe runs. The lack of available space meant that
interference between systems was common which resulted in
design changes in multiple systems. This fueled change
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orders and dramatically increased construction
cost.
Figure 14. DDG-51 Design Issues (26)
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CHAPTER 3 - DESIGN TO BUILD IMPROVEMENTS/ BUILD
STRATEGY:
Product Work Breakdown Structure
The US Navy has been using a SWBS classification system for
the past 60 years. It is a system that provides an initial
approximation at an early stage of design; however, at the
more detailed level it is necessary to incorporate new
features that look at production methods rather than just a
systems approach. Ships are built in subassemblies that are
grouped by common characteristics. The Product Work
Breakdown Structure (PWBS) classifies the different interim
products that are assembled and subdivides the required
work accordingly. These products benefit from cost and
schedule savings because the work is sequenced into a
convenient and functional order. This process is referred
to as group technology. A typical example of its function
is shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. Efficiency of Group Technology (21)
This system of grouping resources efficiently can be
expanded from subassembly to blocks to outfit zones in
order to improve productivity and result in a more
efficient use of a shipyard's resources. Since the PWBS
system operates by creating interim products, the vessel is
built according to zones and assembled at the final stage.
(Figure 16)
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Figure 16. Modular and Zonal Construction (26)
A shipyard that uses this production sequence system needs
to have ship designs that allow vessels to be subdivided
efficiently in this way. In attempting to maximize
productivity, the PWBS approach implies a significant
amount of overlap of design, material procurement, and
production. This is therefore placing added pressure on the
already difficult position of the designer who now has to
incorporate and anticipate the method and sequence of
production.
Modular Construction:
The concept of modular construction is becoming more viable
due to the changes that are occurring in the framework of
the US Navy's procurement strategy. The Navy's
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Affordability Through Commonality (ATC) program is an
example of the effective use of reuse modules. The program
attempts to standardize the number of different components
of Naval Designs (such as using common pumps, pipe sizes,
and plate thickness) . Reuse modules are a logical extension
of standard components of an existing system that can be
incorporated in a new system. If an existing module can be
described, classified, and priced within an interim PWBS,
then that module or direct adaptation of it can be added
directly into the new cost estimate. The cost of the module
and the associated information will be added to the
existing database of modules. Eventually it will be
possible to define any design almost entirely by reuse
modules at any level of the production line from
subassembly to hull erection. (Figure 17)
Design A Product A
Desin aProducl 0
Develqopmn
Figure 17. Converting to Re-Use Modules (25)
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Using the new design and production organization methods
can result in easier, faster, and cheaper ship procurement.
Moreover, the time taken to make a comparative
determination of the effects of a change in design and its
consequent impact on cost will be reduced. The accuracy of
the cost estimate will approach that of a detailed
engineering estimate without the incurred cost and time
lost to conduct the study. It will also give naval
architects a better understanding of the cost implications
of the design decisions that they make and ultimately
result in producing lower cost vessels.
DDG51 vessels were built using modular construction but
they were not designed with modular ship architecture
thereby limiting the possible savings that would result
from the advanced outfitting capabilities of the shipyard.
Figure 18 shows how modular architecture and reuse systems
can be incorporated, scaled, and used throughout different
vessel classes.
38
Common Modular System Architecture
OBJECTIVE: RILD3 SH4IPS COMPORPM OF COMMON MODULtP UL9 -q- DINn BLOCKS. AND
DJSTRIBUTED SYSTEMS A RCHMTECTURES
Fn t
U----- - - - - - - -
-
4a
Figure 18. Using Modular Architecture in the Navy (26)
The economies of scale that are reaped from pursuing such a
focused and organized construction process cannot be
understated or overlooked. Using similar modules for
different vessel types improves shipyard productivity and
decreases costs. Other benefits arise through the process
of purchasing materials and equipment in bulk which again
results in economies of scale. The Navy has attempted to
incorporate an increasing number of subcontracting deals in
order to decrease costs. Having multiple suppliers
increases competition between the contractors which in turn
should increase quality, service, and reduce acquisition
cost. It will also let shipyards focus on the aspects of
construction that they are more efficient or proficient at
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conducting. This would deal with the labor hour overruns
due to the inexperience of the workforce shown in Figure 4.
The UK Royal Navy uses such an approach to build its Type
45 destroyer (Figure 19).
Figure 19. Modular Construction of UK Destroyer (12)
The possible savings that can be
modular production process can
shows the cost savings expected
design initiatives.
realized by switching to a
be pronounced. Figure 20
for DD-21 due to the new
SWBS Mannours (K mnnrs) Mannours Percent Notes:
(using DOG CERs) (using DGIAmpntb CERs) Savings
100 1.458 1,018 30% more producole structure, tritcKer plate,SI less weld distortion
200 145 1 145 0%
300 289 289 0%
400 199 135 32% SMART decks, air lown fiber optics.
modulanty
500 557 394 29% increased deck heights, zonal systems.
ATC modules
600 612 374 39% incresed deck heights. ATC mocuies
700 68 66 ] 0%
800&900 and margin 1 2.336 1.700 | 27% function of SWBS 100-700
Total 5 b.662 1 4121 1 27%
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Figure 20. Predicted Cost Savings (26)
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Learning Curves:
Modularity and increased specialization decreases average
construction cost as more similar vessels are produced.
This is because ship construction labor costs decrease with
experience as build strategy, manufacturing and production
strategy, and management coordinate their efforts with a
more efficient outcome. Therefore the CER's used for the
original vessel have to be modified to take into account
the effects of learning as series of several vessels of the
same class are constructed in sequence.
The basic form of the learning curve is:
Log(y) = Log(a)+b(Log(x))
where: y = Cost of x# of units
a = Cost of 1 St unit
b = Learning curve coefficient
The slope of the learning curve is the learning rate. So,
for 2 units, x =2, and b(Log(x)) equal to the log of the
slope. Thus,
b = Log (slope) / Log(2)
For a 90% slope, b = Log (0.9) / Log (2) = -0.152
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Cost of Nth vessel = Cost of 1 st *N^ (b)
The theory is that each time the total quantity of ships
built doubles, the basic construction cost decreases by a
constant percentage of the former cost. Therefore if the
cost for the first year is 1, the cost for the second
vessel will be 10% less i.e. 90% of the cost of the first.
(Or using the equation, y = 2^(-0.152) = 0.9). The cost of
the third vessel will be = 3^(-0.152) = 0.846, or 84.6% of
the cost of the first vessel. Figure 21 shows how the
effect of different learning curves decreases costs as
output increases.
Cost Learning Curves
0
0 1 Z 15 0 25
Ship Number in Series Ship Construction
Program
Figure 21. Effect of Learning on Cost (14)
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Learning is different for each process that is being
performed and varies depending on a variety of factors
including system complexity, manufacturing technology, and
construction time between completion and start of each
following ship. Low skill level processes tend to exhibit
low levels of learning since there is little or no
reduction in the amount of labor with repeated performance
of a certain task. Highly automated operations tend to also
have slopes close to unity since machines do not increase
their productivity through experience. Production
innovation processes such as modulization and PWBS increase
shipyard efficiency and decrease cost but it is not
necessarily attributed to learning effects. The major
region where learning makes a substantial difference is
with highly skilled labor. This is because skilled labor
can significantly improve its efficiency with experience.
Figure 22 shows how different manufacturing activities
exhibit differences in learning rates.
Manufacturing Activity Typical Slope %
Electronics 90-95
Machining 90-95
Electrical 75-85
Welding 88-92
Figure 22. Typical Learning Rates (20)
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Generally, if an operation requires 75% manual and 25%
automation, slopes in the vicinity of 80% are common. If
the ratio is 50:50, slopes are in the 85% region. If the
ratio is 25:75 the learning rate is in the 90% region.
Typical shipbuilding learning slopes tend to run between 80
and 85%.
There are instances when using learning curve correction
factors is not appropriate. Such situations include:
" When ship construction is sporadic
" When the types of functions performed are inconsistent
(custom products)
" When work is highly automated and production rate
cannot increase further
" When rules and regulations limit the production rate
" When production quantities are small
Sporadic production, either due to low levels of orders, or
labor issues such as extended strikes, results in breaks in
production. The effects of such a time gap between
resumption of construction can result in a stepped increase
in cost upon resumption of construction as shown in Figure
23.
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Figure 23. Effect of Break in Production (1)
Other instances where similar increases in cost can occur
include major upgrades to facilities and changes to
production processes since labor requires a certain amount
of time to become accustomed to the new facilities and
production methods. A typical example would be Philadelphia
Kvaerner Masa yard. A major upgrade to the facilities
increased the cost of construction because workers were not
trained to use the new equipment. Significant design
changes and technological upgrades to a class of vessels
can also result in a loss of learning since the production
process is inherently different. Thus CER's that the Navy
uses for ship cost estimating have to be used with extreme
caution since they can result in significant variations
between actual and predicted costs.
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A major point of contention between the Navy and shipyards
has been the costs of DDG 79 and the Virginia class
submarines due to the cancellation of the order of 5
vessels over the past 10 years. During the cold war the US
was constructing about 17 vessels per annum. Today, the
number is down to less than 6. It is therefore necessary to
re-evaluate and question whether it is applicable to use
current correction factors for cost benefits that could
arise from improvements in learning.
Benefits of Reduced Construction Time:
Korean shipyards proved that by pre-negotiating an exact
delivery time with a detailed work breakdown structure and
essentially outlawing change orders, it was possible to
decrease construction time by 30%. Analysis of construction
costs has shown that by decreasing the time taken from
concept design to delivery by 50% it will be possible to
decrease total costs by as much as 30% (19) . Although it
may be infeasible and undesirable to decrease costs by 50%,
it is clear that the time value of money should play a much
more important role in the decision making aspects of the
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naval procurement process. By having longer projects the
Navy incurs the following costs:
1. Interest on capital
2. Interest on material inventory
3. Extra labor and material cost due to escalation
factors (inflation)
4. Opportunity cost of facilities usage and cost
of occupancy of facilities
5. Increased overhead costs
6. Cost of built-in obsolescence
7. Cost of rescheduling and planning
In short, as long as the vessel is held in drydock, the
final acquisition cost will continue to rise. With post
cold war reduction in military spending and the consequent
decrease in procurement of naval vessels combined with a
historical decrease in the Jones Act fleet, shipyards are
not interested in decreasing manhours and/or project time.
Since shipyards rely on naval procurement to remain in
business, they inherently work slowly, and produce
expensive ships with as many extra change orders as
possible. Thus the Navy has to re-evaluate the way it
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expects shipyards to operate if any benefits are to be made
by using modern, highly efficient production methods. The
existence of a PWBS system of construction has been in
existence since the late 1980's. In fact the same shipyards
that produce cost and time overruns for naval construction
projects can build commercial vessels in a fraction of the
time and cost. Figure 24 shows the speed that a commercial
bulk carrier was built at Avondale shipyards by using a
PWBS for vessel construction.
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Figure 24. Construction using PWBS (21)
The vessel was launched 43 days after keel laying! US
shipyards are still very far from attaining production
levels experienced in Far East yards, which generally
produce similar vessels at about 50% of the time. However,
there is no reason that the same US yards cannot use the
same production methods to build naval vessels.
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In order to understand the value of a shorter construction
period, it is necessary to conduct a present value analysis
of future costs associated with longer construction
periods. While it is relatively trivial to estimate the
costs relating to labor, capital and material of a longer
project, assigning a value to the added cost of built-in
obsolescence is much harder. Built-in obsolescence itself
is a knife with two edges. The elimination of change orders
would probably result in an increase in short term re-
conversion and upgrade of equipment; conversely, it has
been shown that there are significant benefits that can be
attained by shorter construction times without expensive,
time consuming change orders.
Multi- Purpose Vessels
Navy mission requirements have become less focused and as a
result, vessels have been designed with multiple
capabilities. As a result, the navy is more flexible at any
given time at the expense of capital and operating costs.
By their nature multipurpose vessel designs incorporate
performance penalties that are imposed by their various
different requirements. It can be argued, that most vessels
under typical missions perform only one main mission
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function. For example, during the Gulf War, the primary use
of warships was surface to surface bombardment. Most
vessels were equipped and manned to perform many other
functions such as anti-submarine and surface-to-air
warfare, but the capabilities were never used.
In naval ships the operating cost breakdown is 37%
personnel, 21% maintenance, and 13% modernization (14).
This emphasizes the need to reduce both manning and extra
equipment. With more focused missions it is possible to
reduce the crew size which would have dedicated personnel
for each mission capability. Furthermore, specialization
and training of the crew on primary and secondary mission
requirements could improve operational proficiency and
effectiveness.
Figure 25 performs a present value comparison of three
different vessel configurations by mission. The multi
purpose cost is significantly more expensive to construct
and operate. Clearly, a more specialized mission oriented
Navy would require more vessels and better operations
management. A fleet increase of 35% comprising 60% type A
and 75% type B vessels could be procured and operated at:
(0.6*1.113+0.75*1.032) = 1.442C. This is about 82.5% of the
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cost of procuring and operating a smaller fleet of multiple
purpose vessels.
Figure 25. A Single or Multi Purpose Navy (19)
Cost Estimating Relationships:
CER's are formulas that relate the cost of an item to the
item's physical or functional characteristics. They can
also compare the cost of an item to the cost of another
item or group of items. They are historically derived
through regression and parametric analysis. Since CER's are
derived from physical data, it is necessary to understand
how the data correlates to the problem that is being solved
in each particular cost estimate. CER's vary in complexity
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Table I Comparative characteristics
Multi-purposc shiw Single purpot-e ships
TFpe A Type R
Displacement D 0.4D 0.4C
AAW capability Primary Pumarv Fair
ASW capability Primary Fair Primary
GSF capabilitv Good Poor Good
Screws# 2 2 1
Speed (kn) X X+2 X
MaIning M OM 0.5M
Procu rement cost C 0.tC 0. iC
Endurance Same Same Same
FuIe cvst. PV 20 vears* 0-0780C 0.067C 0.05iC
Crew cost PV20 years 0.480C 0.310C 0.310C
Overhaui cos / 20 year 0.11 4C 0 00C 0.067C
Operating ;und! /PV 20 y. rs 0.O IC 0.010C 0.010(C
Re-air Oarts,. PV 20 yeas 0.031C 0.022C 0.020(
Commissr P\ '0 ears. 0.040C 0.024C 0 024C
Port costs and scervice PV 20 yeArs
Total discounted
comparative 20 year cost 1.746C 1.113C 1.032C
PV=pfes4,- viu 2ear Lot
and detail between the concept design stage and the detail
design stage. Their significance lies in their ability to
provide ship cost estimators with reliable results without
the time and cost that would be incurred through the use of
a detailed engineering analysis of a design. There are five
main types of CER's:
" Manual - determined from external information such as
vendors and subcontractors
" Calculated - determined and derived from actual
previous ship cost data.
" Predictive - determined though regression from return
data of multiple vessels over time, or from a common
manufacturing method that is changing over time.
" Empirical - determined through statistical regression
analysis of particular shipyard processes.
" Standard Interim Products - determined at each level
of the PWBS. Existing CER's are grouped together into
standard common interim products and modules called
re-use packages.
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CHAPTER 4 - NAVSEA 017 SHIP COST ESTIMATING SYSTEM:
NAVSEA 017 refers to the Naval Sea Systems Command Office
of Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis. The department
prepares the Navy's ship cost estimates from the initial
design feasibility study phase through production award and
extends into actual contract execution for submission to
the annual Department of Defense's shipbuilding budget.
The Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy Appropriation (SCN)
constitutes approximately 10 percent to 15 percent of the
Navy's total annual procurement budget. The appropriation,
as indicated by its name, includes the procurement of ships
and craft to be newly constructed and major ship
conversions (18). An SCN procurement item that has been
authorized by Congress must be fully funded or the work on
it must cease. This "end costed" policy assures that funds
are always available for all reasonably expected costs
through the ship construction. Exceptions to this policy
include ship outfitting and post delivery costs. Also there
are provisions that allow for cost escalation of shipyard
costs due to inflation. In order for a ship cost estimate
to be considered as a potential budget candidate the
following conditions must be met:
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" Written OPNAV cost and feasibility request must be in
hand.
* Formal technical design inputs must be available.
* An approved acquisition strategy and shipbuilding
schedule must be available.
* A cognizant Program Manager must be involved.
Cost estimates are to be prepared and submitted during each
phase of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting system.
These estimates are based on program acquisition strategy,
technical definition and economic data available at the
time of the estimate preparation. Clearly, the confidence
and reliability of the estimates improve as the level of
technical definition increases.
In the past, acquisition design was divided into four new
ship design phases: Feasibility Study Phase, Preliminary
Design Phase, Contract Design Phase and Detail Design
Phase. For almost all major ship programs, NAVSEA would
develop a ship design up to and including Contract Design.
The intent of Contract Design was to provide a ship design
that was sufficiently detailed and technically mature that
a shipbuilder could use it to develop a cost proposal and
ultimately sign a contract to develop the Detail Design and
build the ship. Nowadays, NAVSEA only develops rough
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designs at the concept design level by the NAVSEA 05
division. This allows it to make an analysis of different
alternatives that are submitted. If the specifications that
the DoD requests are met, then the development of the ship
design will be turned over to industry. The latter then
performs feasibility, preliminary and contract designs.
The NAVSEA ship cost estimate classification system is
shown in Table 1. The class "C" estimate is the ultimate
goal of the ship cost estimating process. A class C is a
commitment to Congress by the Navy that additional funds
will not be required (exceptions being escalation factors
due to inflation) . The estimate is based on the three-digit
SWBS system. The estimate also includes cost for government
furnished material. The Cost Estimating Relationships
(CERs) used to calculate the cost estimates are based on:
" an accepted weight estimate using bid information
" current weight estimate when using cost data from the
contractor's latest Cost Performance Report (CPR)
* similar ship construction data of the prospective
building yard(s) where new designs are being costed.
57
Class D estimates deal with ship conversions,
modernizations, and Ship Life Extension Programs (SLEP).
The estimate is comparable to that of a class C except
there are provisions that deal with the uncertainties that
occur with the repair and/or conversion. The requirements
for this estimate include: a complete parts list, weights
of equipment and material that is to be replaced, and a
proposed list of ship alterations.
Class F estimates are prepared using information from
feasibility studies based on single digit SWBS weights and
only general guidance with respect to major electronics and
weapons equipment. The cost estimate is in most cases a
parametric extrapolation of a previous ship design. An
example of such an ASSET model estimate is shown on Figure
26.
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Figure 26. Asset Model Output (20)
A class R estimate is a rough order of magnitude estimate.
It is applicable for designs when the design information
that is being used is not of feasibility standards quality.
There is limited weight information known and the cost
estimate uses old or generalized adjustment factors. Some
examples are:
" a new design of an unconventional ship platform.
* a ship platform that is initially designed to carry
many unconventional or developmental equipments.
* a ship designed beyond the current state of the art.
A class X estimate is applied to situations where the
design is:
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* not developed by the NAVSEA Cost Engineering and
Industrial Analysis Division or the NAVSEA Ship Design
Integration and Engineering Directorate,
Engineering Office, through the normal estimating
process
" provided by other commands or agencies
" directed by higher authority.
TABLE 1. NAVSEA SHIP COST ESTIMATE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
Class Basic Technical Input Use
C Completed Preliminary Design
Three Digit Weights
D Scope of Work, Including
Weights of Deletes & Adds
SHIPALTS and Repairs
F Feasibility Study
One Digit Weights
R Rough Order of Magnitude
Less Than Feasibility Study
X
Budget Phase
(New Construction)
Budget Phase
(Conversion)
Planning/Programming
Phase
Planning Phase
A directed or modified
estimate - an estimate not
developed through the normal
NAVSEA estimating process.
An estimate established
external to NAVSEA.
NAVSEA 05 uses a parametric ship design model called ASSET
(Advanced Surface Ship Evaluation Tool). The model starts
with an existing ship design, or parent ship, that is most
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Cost
closely analogous with the new ship concepts. The ASSET
model iteratively changes the parent ship to reach a
solution that accommodates the desired set of ship
requirements. The design input provided to the cost
estimator from ASSET is adequate to develop Class "R" cost
estimates. The program also has the capability to be linked
with the ACEIT (Automated Cost Estimating Integrated Tools)
program which is a joint Army/Air force program supported
by the Navy. It is also SWBS based in order to conform with
NAVSEA standards but also includes indirect costs,
escalation factors, and learning curves. The system can
also output total life cycle costs for the vessel.
Once a design has been agreed upon, the development of the
project is turned over to industry. The role of the Navy
cost estimator then becomes that of a validation instrument
of the contractors' cost models and estimates. This
requires a large amount of interaction, communication, and
cooperation between the contractor and the Navy personnel.
Several issues of contention arise at this level of
involvement due to the differences in estimating methods
used by the Navy and all the different contractors that it
uses. As a result, NAVSEA generally requires that all data
is provided in SWBS form in order to be effectively and
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efficiently analyzed by 017. This is necessary because
NAVSEA 017 still has to develop cost estimates of budget
quality class C ratings for submission to Congress. 017
also requests that shipbuilders provide actual return cost
data in order to keep the system updated.
The categories that constitute total end cost for a ship
are show in Figure 27. The Major Category Codes (MCC)
conform to the collection, accounting, and review systems
used by NAVSEA. The categories can be separated into three
groupings: shipbuilder portion, government furnished
material (GFM), and general administrative. Construction
plans, basic construction, and change orders (including
shipyard profit which is about 10%) constitute the shipyard
portion.
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ESWBS
Group
100 Hull Structure
200 Propulsion
300 Electric Plant
400 Command andSurveillance
500 Auxiliary Systems
600 Outfit andFurnishings
700 Armament
0aA Integration/
900
Construction Plans
MCC 100
Basic Construction Contract
MCC 200 Escalation
MCC 291
Change Orders
MCC 300
GFM Electronics
MCf 400
GFM Ordnance/Air
MCC 900
GFM HM&E
MCC 500
GFM Propulsion
MCC 521
Other Support
MCC 800
Total Ship End Cost (Dollars)
Figure 27. Total
Change orders have long
Ship Cost Categories (18)
been a region of difficulty for
both the Navy and Congress. The existence of change orders
is commonly due to the looseness of the initial award
contract. The methods that such a change can take place are
indicated in the federal acquisition regulation "changes"
clauses. The reasons for change orders are the following:
0 To include state-of-the-art improvements that come
about during the lengthy construction periods of a
ship,
0 To correct deficiencies discovered in contract
drawings or government furnished information which is
the responsibility of the government,
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Engineering
Ship Assembly and
Support Services
* To correct differences between contract drawings and
ship specifications,
* To incorporate
construction,
safety items that emerge during
0 To incorporate improvements that are generated by the
operational forces afloat, and approved
implementation,
* To have the shipbuilder repair or modify GFM,
" To change the contract ship delivery point, the
contract date of delivery, or the method of shipment
or packing.
There are about 3000 to 8000 change orders each fiscal
year. The budgeted cost for change orders amounts to 10%
for lead ships and 5% for follow ships. As it is in the
interest of the shipyard to include as many change orders
as possible, there is currently no incentive under the
present system to see a decrease in their levels. As
already mentioned in Chapter 1, change orders and the
consequent increase in costs is a very significant number
especially for lead ships. For the DDG-51 change orders
accounted for over 17% of the total cost.
NAVSEA's use of CER's
Historically CER's were used to relate cost to SWBS weights
under the following formula:
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for
C = f * (SWBS weight)
Where f represents a functional relationship relating
material cost per ton and/or labor cost per ton. Other
technical parameters are also used when better results are
anticipated. These could include cost of energy generating
systems that relate cost to power rating and weight. The
following equation would be used:
C = (R/Rs)Kr X (Km x W)
where
Kr = cost factor based on unit power rating
R = power rating (e.g., horsepower) of unit under
consideration
Rs = power rating of "standard" unit
Km = cost per unit of weight
W = weight of unit
These equations generate basic CER relationships. It is
then in the discretion of the estimator as to what extent
he is going to expand on or change the initial CER. Typical
adjustments are made for inflation of labor and material
costs as well as an incorporation of a historically
acceptable level of risk. This process is far from an exact
science and therefore requires judgment and experience.
According to the level of detail of the data available from
the contractor or shipyard, the estimator has to develop
CER's according to the class of estimate that is being
performed. The following estimating relationships are
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presented by NAVSEA as the suggested group relationships
for class F estimates:
SWBS 100 - Hull Structure
Item
GR 150, Deckhouse
weight (Tons)
GR 100, Remaining
weight (Tons)
Labor CER
X MH/Ton
(specific
material)
X MH/Ton
(steel)
Material CER
$/Tons
(specific)
X $/Ton
(steel)
Adjustments are made for different materials used:
Mild Steel (Tons)
High-Yield Steel (Tons)
High-Strength, High-
Alloy Steel (Tons)
X MH/Ton
X MH/Ton
X MH/Ton
For Submarines:
Pressure Hull Weight
(Tons)
GR 100, Remaining
weight (Tons)
SWBS 200 - Propulsion
X MH/Ton
X MH/Ton
Plant
Item
GR 220, Energy
Generation System
GR 230, Propulsion
GR 240, Transmission
Propulsion Systems
GR 200, All Other
Labor CER
MH/Unit, Rating,
Ton, or Combination
MH/Unit, Rating,
Ton, or Combination
MH/Ton
MH/Ton
Material CER
Marine Vendor
Input
Marine Vendor
Input
$/Ton
$/Ton
X $/Ton
X $/Ton
X $/Ton
X $/Ton
X $/Ton
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SWBS 300 - Electric Plant
Item
GR 310, Electric Power
Generation
Labor CER
MH/Unit, Rating,
Ton,
Material CER
Vendor
Input
GR 320, Power Distribution MH/To
Systems (Tons)
GR 330, Lighting System MH/To
(Tons)
GR 300, All Other (Tons) MH/To
SWBS 400 - Command and Surveillance
n
n
n
Item
GR 400, Command and
Labor CER
MH/Ton
Material CER
$/Ton
Surveillance
SWBS 500 - Auxiliary Systems
Item
GR 510, Climate Control
Labor CER
MH/Ton
Material CER
$/Ton*
GR 520, 530, 540, 550, MH/Ton
GR 500, All Other(Tons) MH/Ton
SWBS 600 - Outfit and Furnishings
GR 600, Outfit and
Furnishings (Tons)
GR 630, Painting
MH/Ton
MH/Ton
MH/Cubic Number
SWBS 700 - Armament
Since the majority of armament is GFM, the items are
separately costed by the vendor or subcontractor. Shipyard
costs are for installation of the equipment.
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$/Ton
$/Ton
$/Ton
$/Ton*
$/Ton*
$/Ton
$/Ton
Item Labor CER Material CER
Guns (Units) MH/Unit $/Unit
Missile Launchers (Units) MH/Unit $/Unit
Torpedo Tubes (Units) MH/Unit $/Unit
GR 700, All Other (less MH/Ton $/Ton
weight of guns, etc.) (Tons)
SWBS 800 and 900- Integration/Engineering and Ship Assembly
and Support Services
The manhours and material dollars required for the work
represented by these groups are a function of specification
requirements, type of ship, and most significant, which
shipyard is involved. The historical manhours and material
dollars of Group 800 and 900 can be expressed as a
percentage of the sum of historical manhours and material
dollars for Groups 100 through 700 of the same ship.
Limitations of Weight Based System:
" It cannot easily estimate cost differentials below gross
levels of the work breakdown structure (WBS) . This
precludes the method from being useful for trade-off
studies of designs, materials, and manufacturing
processes.
" It cannot estimate cost differentials of outfit work
performed at different stages of construction: on unit,
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on block and on board. Various established rules of
thumb indicate that these cost differentials can vary
from 300% to 500% or more.
* It cannot estimate cost differentials due to
configuration complexity, such as compartment or system
density (e.g. HVAC system installation in tight
deckhouse) or location on board the ship (e.g. confining
engine room installation versus easily accessible weather
deck installation).
* It cannot estimate cost differentials due to orientation
of work (e.g. less productive over head work versus more
productive down hand work).
" It cannot estimate cost differentials due to changes in
build strategy, including outsourcing the manufacturing
of selected components to more productive, less costly
vendors and suppliers.
* Since it operates mostly at high levels of the WBS, it
cannot easily translate or segment costs from one type of
ship to another, particularly ship types and hull forms
not yet developed and built.
In typical government fashion, although it is clear that a
Paleolithic cost estimating system is being used, little is
being done to improve the current situation. The NAVSEA
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guide for the ship cost estimator (18) suggests that
although "weight is the most commonly used parameter and
has been shown in the past to provide good estimates, in
the past the cost estimator has been encouraged to explore
other available parameters to be used with, or in lieu of
weight if improved results are anticipated". Although the
reference manual states this fact, cost estimates conducted
by the Navy are still primarily weight based.
How can weight be the single most important cost factor
when different designs can have the same weight but
completely different cost? The current approach inherently
gives incorrect estimates especially when comparing
competing preliminary designs because the system is not
sensitive enough when evaluating the effects of subtle
design changes.
The weight based model does not reflect or incorporate the
effects of productivity changes or the process by which the
vessel is built. An example is increasing the "shape" of a
hullform by reducing the amount of parallel midbody. The
change in actual steel structure weight may be
insignificant in terms of the cost estimating
relationships, resulting in no change in estimated cost.
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However, eliminating several flat block modules will
definitely result in a cost increase within a modular
product oriented cost module such as PODAC. Figure 28 shows
that cost not only changes with ship size but also with
ship form.
Average Structural Size Productivity Factors
(Variable by Block Coefficient)
4 4 + f I
100 200 300
LWL (M)
400
-+- 040
-a- 0.50
0.60
- 0.70
--- 0.80
-0- 0.90
500
Figure 28. Index of Estimated Shipbuilding Costs (16)
The current estimating method makes no allowance or
consideration of life cycle costs. This is major impediment
when making trade off studies between different designs.
Operating costs over the life of a vessel can amount to
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over 75% of total life cycle costs. Thus a cost estimating
system that only focuses on initial acquisition cost
without consideration for life cycle costs is inherently
flawed. It is important and necessary that both designers
be able to conduct reliable cost benefit analysis and
design trade offs at the early stage of program
development; and that mission leaders ensure that the
mission requirements are realistic and can be met in an
efficient and cost effective manor. In most cases a lack of
visibility of the true problem or issue can lead to
appropriation of unnecessary, ineffective, and
operationally useless and/or expensive vessels.
In all fairness to the Navy, NAVSEA faces great difficulty
in acquiring useful data from shipyards. In most cases the
costs are bid data. The data is also gathered on the basis
of a distributed system rather than on the basis of a
production unit which forces the Navy to use a SWBS cost
breakdown.
The next chapter will give insight into how industry has
evolved its ship cost estimating capabilities in order to
incorporate non weight based parameters into their
forecasts.
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CHAPTER 5 - PODAC:
The Product Oriented Design and Construction (PODAC) cost
model was conceived as a means of developing a cost model
that would employ a product oriented work breakdown system
(PWBS) and group technology (GT) . The system was developed
by a joint government, industry, and academia consortium
and the research funded by the Naval Surface Warfare Center
(NSWC). The developing team was comprised of:
" Avondale Industries
" Bath Iron Works
" Ingalls Shipbuilding
* National Shipbuilding and Steel Company
* Newport News Shipbuilding
" University of Michigan
" Designers and Planners
" SPAR Associates
* NAVSEA
The new program was designed to address the long standing
issue facing the traditional weight based models that were
primarily linked to design features. The PODAC system
incorporates algorithms that can determine the effects on
cost of subtle design changes that have little or no impact
on weight. It is a program that focuses on the production
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process of each interim product rather than on broad
generalizations provided for by weight based CER's. Figure
29 shows how PODAC changes the viewpoint of a project from
a System based to a Product based approach.
SYSTEM WBS PRODUCT WBS
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Figure 29. System vs. Product WBS (16)
The program has been operational since 1997 and has been
successfully used in a wide range of programs both for
government and industry specifications both domestically
and internationally.
As already previously described, the system uses a PWBS
system to define costs. The work is defined using three
types of information: product structure, process, and work
type. The hierarchical classification breakdown is shown on
Figure 30. At each stage or process, interim products are
defined by their specific work types that make up the
finished product. In this way it is possible to assess the
effects of design changes and innovations as well as to
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analyze their impact on the total life cycle cost of a
vessel.
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z me.
Whereas in a SWBS cost estimating system CER's are
generally defined through weight based relationships, in a
PWBS system the definition of CER's changes with each level
of definition. Examples of such evolution of CER definition
is shown in Figure 31.
Possible Levels of Cost Estimating Relationships
-- Mhrs"EA
Mhrs/To
Nhrs/Ton
hlrs/Toni
Figure 31. CER Change with PWBS Hierarchy (14)
Use of Empirical CERs in the PODAC Model
Empirical CERs are also used in the Parametric Module of
the PODAC Cost Model to provide a top-down approach for
estimating Basic Construction Costs at the Concept,
Preliminary, and Contract stages of design:
* concept design level cost based on complexity factor
(explained later in this report), displacement, and
speed,
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" preliminary design level cost based on complexity
factor and system-based weight at the SWBS one-digit
level,
* contract design level cost based on complexity
factor and system-based weight at the SWBS two- or
three-digit level.
A combination of traditional weight based CER's used in
conjunction with complexity factors, process, and product
based CER's form the backbone of the PODAC estimating
system at every level of design.
1. Concept Design Level:
Price = Complexity Factor x [ 752 x DISPL 0 .835 x SPEED' .2]
*where Price is the sum of Labor Cost, Material Cost,
All Indirect Costs, and Profit
Complexity Factor = Ship Type Factor x Size Factor
Ship Type Factor from Table 2
Size Factor = 32.47 x DISPL 03 79 2
DISPL = full load displacement in long tons
SPEED = maximum sustained speed in knots
It is important to note that at the Concept Design level,
there is no ability to distinguish between the various
elements of price, such as labor and material costs.
77
the price estimate determined using this
approach was for U.S. Shipbuilding Programs, was for the
first ship of a class, and did not include the cost for
design and engineering. For naval ships, it did not
include the costs of weapons or Navy program management.
Table 2. Sample Ship Type Factors for Empirical CERs
LSHIP TYPE FACTOR
Tanker 0.80
Product Tanker Single Hull 1.13
Chemical Tanker 1.25
Double Hull Tanker 0.90
Bulk Carrier 0.86
Ore/Bulk/Ore Carrier 0.95
Reefer 1.16
Containership 0.96
Roll-On/Roll-Off 0.83
Car Carrier 0.61
Liquid Petroleum Gas Carrier 1.14
Liquid Natural Gas Carrier 1.12
Ferry - Aluminum High Speed 0.15
Ferry 1.25
Ferry - Aluminum SWATH 0.70
Passenger 3.00
Fishing 2.20
Harbor Tug 0.20
Naval Aircraft Carrier 6.00
Naval Combatant, Cruiser (Nuclear) 9.00
Naval Combatant, Destroyer 8.00
Naval Combatant, Frigate 7.00
Naval Amphibious, LHD/LHA 7.00
Naval Amphibious, LSD/LPD 5.00
Naval Auxiliary, Oiler 2.25
Naval Auxiliary, Tender 4.50
Naval Research 1.25
Naval Fleet Tug 1.00
US Coast Guard Icebreaker 4.50
US Coast Guard Buoy Tender 2.00
78
Additionally,
Complexity Factor = Ship Type Factor (from table 2) x Size
Factor
Size Factor = 32.47 x DISPL-
0
.3792
DISPL = full load displacement in long tons
2. Preliminary Design Level:
At the Preliminary Design level, the following weight-based
CERs for Domestic Shipbuilding Programs can be seen to
distinguish labor from material as shown in Table 3.
Complexity Factors are derived from the
and Size Factors as shown before in Table
Ship Type Factors
2.
Table 3. Empirical Preliminary CER Derivation
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SWBS DESCRIPTION LABOR MANHOURS MATERIAL DOLLARS
100 Structure CF x 177 x 800 x WGT1oo
WGT100 0.862
200 Propulsion CF x 365 x 15,000 + 20,000 x
WGT 200 0.704 WGT 200
300 Electrical 682 x WGT 30 0 1 .0 2 5  25,000 x WGT 30 0
400 Command and 1, 605 x WGT 40 0 0 .795 40,000 x WGT 40 0
Control
500 Auxiliary CF x 34.8 x 10,000 + 10,000 x
WGT50 1.24 WGT500
600 Outfit and 310 x WGT 6 0 0 .9 49  5, 0 0 + 10, 000 x
Furnishings WGT 60 0
II
UU
U
U
CF = Complexity Factor = Ship Type Factor x Size Factor
Size Factor = 32.47 x DISPL-
0
.3792
DISPL = full load displacement in long tons
WGTxoo = weight of SWBS X00 in long tons
3. Contract Design Level:
At the Contract Design level, weight-based
Domestic Shipbuilding Programs can also be seen
guish labor from material, as shown in Table 4.
to distin-
As before,
Complexity Factors are derived from the Ship Type Factors
and Size Factors.
SWBS DESCRIPTION LABOR MANHOURS
110 Hull Structure CF x 4 x WGT110' 321
150 Superstructure CF x 5, 157 x WGT1 5 0
0
.
3 8 4
161 Structural Castings and CF x 314 x WGT 1 6 1 0.
62 3
Forgings
167/ Structural Closures 60 x WGT 1 67 / 8
1
-
2 95
8
169 Special Purpose Closures CF x 36 x WGT1 6 9 0.
96 9
170 Masts and Towers CF x 149 x WGT 170
0
'
735
Table 4. Empirical Contract Level CER Examples
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CERs for
CF = Complexity Factor = Ship Type Factor x Size Factor
Size Factor = 32.47 x DISPL-.
3 7 92
DISPL = full load displacement in long tons
WGTxyo = weight of SWBS XYO in long tons
Similar Contract Design Labor CERs have been derived for
SWBS Groups 2 - 6.
Improving Empirical CERs:
The suggested product-based and process-based Empirical
CERs include the following, at the Preliminary Design level
of detail. It is important to note that these Preliminary
CERs are constructed by collecting data at the Contract and
Detailed Design levels.
* STRUCTURE at the BLOCK level, with known block
structural weight, number of parts, surface area,
and joint weld length:
- manhours = f (number of parts) for preparation,
- manhours = f (number of parts) for fabrication,
- manhours = f (weight, surface area, weld length) for
sub-assembly,
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- manhours = f (weight, surface area, weld length) for
assembly,
- manhours = f (weight, surface area, weld length)
for erection.
* PIPING at the BLOCK level, with known block piping
number of parts:
- manhours = f (number of parts)
- manhours = f (number of parts)
- manhours = f (number of parts)
manhours = f (number of parts)
for preparation,
for fabrication,
for sub-assembly,
for assembly.
* OUTFIT at the BLOCK level, with known block outfit
weight and number of parts:
- manhours = f (weight, number of parts) for on-unit
outfitting,
- manhours= f (weight, number of parts) for on-block
outfitting,
- manhours= f (weight, number of parts) for on-board
outfitting.
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0 PAINTING at the BLOCK level,
surface area:
- manhours = f (surface area) for block painting,
- manhours = f (surface area) for final painting.
Sample Representations of Empirical CERs:
For Preliminary Design level CERs for LABOR in MANHOURS:
STRUCTURE manhours:
Preparation = f (Complexity Factor (CF), number of parts)
Fabrication = f (CF, number of parts)
Sub-Assembly = f (CF, weight, surface area, weld length)
Assembly = f (CF, weight, surface area, weld length)
Erection = f (CF, weight, surface area, weld length)
PIPING manhours:
Preparation = f (CF, number of parts)
Fabrication = f (CF, number of parts)
Sub-Assembly = f (CF, number of parts)
Assembly = f (CF, number of parts)
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with known block
OUTFITTING manhours:
On-Unit Outfitting = f (CF, number of parts, weight)
On-Block Outfitting = f (CF, number of parts, weight)
On-Board Outfitting = f (CF, number of parts, weight)
PAINTING manhours:
Block Painting = f (CF, surface area requiring paint)
Final Painting = f (CF, surface area requiring paint)
SUPPORT manhours: = f (CF, displacement)
Complexity Factors:
There are several types of complexity factors that have
been introduced into the PODAC system that adjust CER's.
Several of these empirically derived complexity factors
have been presented in the previous section. Complexity
factors adjust CER equations according to each level of the
hierarchy of the PWBS. The reason for this is that working
conditions become increasingly more difficult, time
consuming, and expensive as the work progresses from the
workshop to on board installation. Ideally the most
preferable place to do work would be:
0 Under Cover
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* At an easily accessible area
" Where less support services are required
" Where tools and equipment are readily available
Thus the most cost efficient place to construct and
assemble the vessel is in the workshop. The least desirable
work location is to do the work on board. On block work
when the blocks are not too large (under 500 tons) are more
convenient workplaces than onboard. There is added
productivity if the blocks can be assembled under cover to
eliminate the effects of weather conditions. Lastly on unit
work, which involves the assembly of outfit modules, can
produce cost savings since it is easier to access, assemble
and outfit a unit on block rather than on board. Figure 32
shows comparative complexity factors assigned to different
work sites.
Addad Cost Factor
500%
400%-
300%-
200%-
100% 6
0%
In Shop On Block On Board
Figure 32. Complexity Factor by Work Stage (15)
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Complexity factors differ not only by the location of the
work, but by the type of work being performed at that
particular location. For example down hand welding is much
cheaper and more productive than overhead work at any stage
of production. However, the CER's being used at each level
of the PWBS cannot be the same for the same type of work
being conducted due to the difficulty of access to the
workplace. Figure 33 shows typical complexity factors that
are assigned to different working sectors of a vessel.
Figure 33. Complexity Factor by Work Area (23)
Interim Products (IP)
The CER's that are developed and incorporated into the new
system are there in order to subdivide the vessel in a
series of pre-costed, re-usable modules or packages of work
to be conducted. Typical examples of standard work packages
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TABLE 10.1 Typical Added Complexity Of Ship Zone Work
Ship Zone Added Cost Factor
On Weather Deck 0%
Oil Tanks 25%
Engine Room 50%
Superstructure 25%
Pump Room 50%
Holds 10%
Double bottom 25%
are shown in Figure 34. Standard work packages, just like
CERs that are developed for different sections of the ship
are categorized and organized in libraries within the
system. The Cost estimator can then select the appropriate
combination of CERs or work packages pertaining to the
particular project.
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Figure 34. Examples of Work Packages (14)
Such reusable modules can be subdivided into reusable work
packages that consume a standard amount of material,
require a standard amount of work, and cost a standard
amount of money. A typical example of such a process is
shown on Figure 35.
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Figure 35. Example of Re-Useable Work Package (16)
In order for such a cost system to be effectively
implemented in shipyards in order to maximize cost savings
presented by pre outfitted, modular construction, it is
necessary that the technical design information sent to the
shipyard is tailored with such a build organization
strategy in mind. Experience from the construction of the
DDG-51 showed that although the shipyards had the
capability to construct the vessel using modular methods
and on block outfitting, the lack of design consideration
to the generic build strategy resulted in excessive re-
workings and a low level of productivity.
SPAR Associates conducted a study to determine the possible
cost savings that could occur by the use of a modular, PWBS
strategy built vessel that attempted to maximize cost
savings through the use of minimal on board outfitting.
Figure 36 shows a summary of the results. It is important
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Re-Use Package CER:
Welding Repairs:Cracks Labor CER Labor JoM I
Drill Out 0.500 MHtFT
Welding Repairs: 0.250 MHIFT
Gen Labor: 0.250 MH/FT
Total: 1.000 MH/FT
-- - - --- 
_ -- -- ____ -
to note the 16% cost savings realized by the implementation
of such a generic build strategy.
Figure 36. Possible Outfitting Cost Savings (15)
Design Trade off Capabilities
An interesting feature of the new PODAC system is the
incorporation of new hullforms such as catamarans, and
trimarans into the database. The development of new CER's
for different vessel classes and designs is very important
as the Navy continues to design and purchase vessels with
such configurations. Any added data into the system and CER
libraries helps make the final ship cost estimation more
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realistic. Clearly submarine CER's cannot be used for
destroyer class vessels. Similarly, steel monohull CER's
cannot be used for composite trimarans. Figure 37 shows the
variations of material CER's that are available with the
new PODAC system.
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Figure 37. Material Options with PODAC (16)
The inclusion of such data has led to a new area of
important design trade offs. That is the decision between
choosing different materials for particular ship regions.
The use of a re-use/ modular construction and design allows
the designer or cost estimator to immediately determine the
cost of using different materials for the whole vessel or
for parts of it. Figure 38 shows the effect on weight of
using different materials on a Trimaran hull.
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As already stated rather repeatedly throughout this thesis,
it is not enough to simply have a weight based analysis in
order to determine costs. In an effort to produce lower
costs, DDG-51's deckhouse was built with thin plate. This
resulted in excessive plate distortion due to the welding
process. This distortion made the assembly of blocks highly
labor intensive requiring the use of hydraulic rams. Figure
39 shows the clear benefit of using a non weight based
system to analyze ship construction costs.
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39. Construction Cost Material Trade-off (16)
Although Aluminium is the least cost solution as presented
in Figure 38, it suffers from higher installation costs.
The welding process is difficult, expensive, and requires
highly trained labor. Aluminium also has a lower tensile
strength than steel and therefore requires stronger
structure to support the hull, equipment, and armament.
This results in more structure and thus higher costs. The
PODAC system has the capability with
CER's to incorporate the build complexity
production into its predictions.
its
and
comprehensive
difficulty of
Other trade-off studies that can be conducted by the new
system include:
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" Changes in equipment and related auxiliary systems
e.g. AZIPOD propulsion versus geared diesel and rudder
propulsion.
* Changes in subcontractors e.g. subcontracting the
vessel pipe work.
" Changes in general arrangement or mission requirement.
Such trade-off capabilities allow the vessel designers an
immediate understanding of the cost implication of their
design decisions or changes. An understanding on the part
of the designer as to why costs increase is a fundamental
paradigmatic change in the thought process of ship
procurement. It should definitely result in cheaper and
faster vessel construction.
Risk Analysis
An important capability of the PODAC system is the ability
that it presents the cost estimator to specify a range of
possible costs for items or processes that are considered
high risk. The greater the risk, the greater the
probability that the cost estimate is not realistic.
Since it is impossible to exactly determine beforehand the
type of probability distribution that can be applied to
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each process or CER due to the variability of real life
issues, the program requires the input of an expected
maximum and minimum value of cost. This essentially
presents a series of triangular probability distributions.
The program then combines the different probability
functions into one single, complex distribution and the
data is analyzed using Monte Carlo Risk. The data is then
combined into a cumulative probability distribution of
costs. Figure 40 shows an example of such a distribution.
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Figure 40. Cumulative Cost Distribution (14)
The existence of a probability distribution allows the
estimator to develop a sense of confidence in the data that
is produced, the probability that the estimate will be
wrong, and what the range of possible cost will be about
the expected prediction. The probability that cost does not
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exceed the estimators most
presented in Figure 41.
cost estimate is
Figure 41. Probability Cost does not Exceed Estimate (14)
Life Cycle Costs
Life cycle costs can be essentially divided into four main
stages: conception, acquisition, operation, and disposal.
In order to correctly cost and evaluate a project it is
necessary to make a prediction for each stage. Such costs
have always been an area of concern for commercial ship
owners. The reason is that ship owners are interested in
the final bottom line of profit and return on investment.
SPAR Associates' shipyard cost estimating program provides
ship owners with design trade-offs that pertain to life
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cycle costs. The significance of operational and
maintenance costs (about 75% of life cycle costs) has been
already stated several times in previous sections. The cost
estimating program allows the ship owner and the designer
to immediately determine the required freight rate in order
to have a certain return on investment (ROI) over a certain
time period. Thus the design trade-off analysis can be
expressed in terms of life cycle costs.
The importance of this added feature should not be
overlooked by the Navy. Although naval acquisitions do not
have a particular ROI requirement, they must satisfy a
national security commitment at the least possible cost. It
is therefore necessary for the Navy to understand the
components of life cycle costs and how it is possible to
reduce them. The Navy currently has several reporting
systems such as the Ownership Architecture Retrieval System
(OARS) for maintenance issues, COMET for personnel costs,
which are all part of a Total Ownership Cost (TOC)
breakdown. These systems deal with life cycle costs but
they are not integrated between themselves in order to
provide direct answers to design trade off questions at the
design, costing, and acquisition decision level.
96
Problems:
Several issues have arisen due to the lack of coordination
between the Navy, shipyards, and subcontractors. Designers
building ships for the US Navy are using system based cost
estimates which do not focus on the producibility of
design. Shipyards are costing and building vessels with a
product based approach; while the Navy is conducting its
own cost operation using cost data provided by the shipyard
in a product based format!
A cost estimate is only as good as the information
supporting the estimate... if historical costs cannot be
collected in ways that identify modular block costs,
estimating by modular blocks can be difficult and will
probably have a relatively high degree of risk in the
accuracy and validity of the estimate. (14) It is therefore
imperative that shipyards organize costs in ways that can
directly benefit the cost estimating process.
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CHAPTER 6 - MIT MATH MODEL
The MIT Math Model was developed in 1975 by Clark Graham
while serving as the 13A course Associate Professor of
Naval Construction in conjunction with 13A student R.
Hamley. It was developed as an educational tool in order to
assist 13A students with the ship cost estimating process
for their ship design projects. It was adapted from the
Navy Synthesis Model and called "Simplified Math Model for
the Design of Naval Frigates". The model was revised and
updated in 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990. It is in excel
format and designed to be a balance between simplicity,
sophistication, and generality. It is relatively easy to
understand and use and it is compatible with all personal
computers.
Users of the model have to; however, understand its
limitations. It is designed in order to be applicable to
Naval Frigates, with a range of displacements from 2500 to
8500 tons. The model analyzes only conventional monohulls
and assumes standard USN design practices. The system is
limited to single screw vessels with diesel generator sets.
The hull materials considered are mild steel hull with
options for aluminium or mild steel superstructure. The
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system uses the USN SWBS weight breakdown system for
weights. The empirically derived CER's are therefore
primarily weight based. The model therefore has a limited
scope without much flexibility for change. Having said
that, its purpose is a teaching tool for naval ship design.
The students are not presenting their designs to NAVSEA for
appropriations from Congress, nore are they submitting
detailed engineering designs to shipyards for construction.
Thus at this level of preliminary design the model appears
to be successful. Even the most modern (PODAC) systems
still use parametric weight based empirical CER's from
historical data (Chapter 5) . Thus MIT's system is not using
methods that far from standard industry practice at this
level of design.
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CHAPTER 7 - SHIP COST REDUCTION SUGGESTIONS:
1. Improve quality of Cost Estimates
* Improve the current cost estimating method that the
Navy is using incorporating improvements discussed
throughout this thesis.
0 Conduct independent cost estimates in addition,
support, and comparison of the Navy predictions to
assure accuracy.
* Conduct independent cost estimates of any change order
work that is suggested by shipyards in order to
determine accuracy and reliability.
2. Improve contract award process
0 Negotiate prices for construction of the lead ship
separately from the pricing of detail design work.
* Separate the pricing of lead ships from follow on
ships. (4)
3. Improve management of programs
Require shipyards to submit monthly cost performance
reports in order to allow project leaders to quickly
become aware of cost driving factors.
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4. Design Cheaper Vessels
Cheaper vessels can be designed and built in cheaper,
simpler, and faster methods by using the following general
guidelines:
" Maximum use of standard plate and stiffener sizes.
* Avoid using thin plate to avoid distortions
* Do not carry hull curvature into the structure
inside of the hull plating
" Run strakes in the same direction as primary framing
* Design for maximum use of high productivity tools
such as automatic welding
" Design bilge strakes with the same thickness as
bottom plates
* Design to facilitate assembly and erection with
structural units, machinery units, and piping units
" Make port and starboard units similar
" Eliminate camber and sheer
" Eliminate cruiser sterns and cambered transoms
* Maximize use of flat panels, straight frames, and
reduce plate curvature
* Locate knuckles and chins at unit breaks
* Run chins parallel to keel (as much as possible)
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stern shape by removing unnecessary
curvature
0 Allow for large deckspace to facilitate outfitting
(9)
It is necessary however to be able to balance producibility
with life cycle costs and performance. The ability to
perform design trade-offs particularly at the conceptual
and early stages of design, where decisions are generally
established rather firmly, should be a top priority.
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0 Simplify bow and
CONCLUSION
Introducing paradigmatic change in any business is
difficult. Doing so is even harder for government. The
introduction of integrated product teams between the Navy
and the industry co-operating together from concept design
to delivery can ensure a better consideration for
acquisition and total life cycle costs.
Naval ship cost estimating has not seen any significant
change since the 1980's. Cost is still estimated using
outdated and inaccurate weight based ship cost estimating
models whose assumptions and inability to reflect subtle
design changes result in cost overruns.
The PODAC model attempts to deal with many of the issues
cost facing the Navy today. Although the government
essentially funded the project, cost estimations are not
using the new systems. To a large extent this is probably
because the results have not been clear in similar
projects. It probably does not help that the design of the
LPD-17, which ended up being grossly overpriced, included
many PODAC principles. Also in order for the new program to
be effective and produce realistic estimates, it is
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necessary for both industry and the
operating and thinking in this new and
will take some time to get accustomed
faith in a product based approach but
eventually happen for the Navy as
effectively abroad.
Navy to practice
different way. It
and begin to have
I believe it will
it has happened
The MIT Math Model is a useful engineering tool. For the
purpose that it serves it is probably a reasonable method.
Its estimates are not expected to be realistic given the
limitations of the model. It should be examined whether it
would be possible to acquire a cost estimating program such
as the one developed by SPAR Associates in order to improve
the accuracy of the cost estimates conducted at MIT.
104
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. "An Approach for Developing a Preliminary Cost
Estimating Methodology for USCG Vessels", Mark Gray, MIT,
June 1987
2. Cost Assessment in Ship Production, The Naval Architect,
March 2005
3. Design and Cost Estimating Metrics, NASSCO, April 2000
4. Defense Acquisitions, GAO, February 2005
5. Characterization of Performance Requirements, NASSCO,
February 1999
6. "A Practical Approach for Ship Construction Cost
Estimating", Jonathan Ross
7. Navy Ship Acquisitions: Options for Lower-Cost Ship
Designs, Ronald O'Rourke, June 2005
8. "Portfolio of Ship Designs: Early-Stage Design Tools",
Thomas Schiller et al, Marine Technology, April 2001
9. "The Impact of Producibility on Cost and Performance in
Naval Combatant Design", Capt. Alan Brown et al, SNAME,
November 1996
10. "Navy Develops Product Oriented Design and Construction
Cost Model", Scott Truver, February 2001
11. "A Parametric Cost Model for Estimating Acquisition
Costs of Conventional US Navy Surface Ships", Kirk Loftus,
Naval Postgraduate School, September 1999
12. "A Producibility Review of the Contingency Producible
Corvette and an Alternative Producibility Design", Corey
Bruno and Thomas Lamb, University of Michigan, Report #
9050-03-C5
13. Department of the Navy: 2007 President's Budget,
Admiral Stan Bozin, February 2006
105
14. Shipyard Cost Estimating, SPAR Associates Inc.
15. Cost Savings Using Modular Construction Methods & Other
Common Sense, SPAR Associates Inc., August 1998
16. Cost Estimating New Construction & Ship Repair User
Manual, SPAR Associates Inc., January 2003
17. MIT Math Model User Manual
18. NAVSEA Ship Cost Estimating: A Referance Manual for the
Ship Cost Estimator, NAVSEA, versions: 1992, 2002
19. "In Pursuit of a Cost Effective Navy", Prof. Frankel,
The Institute of Marine Engineers, September 1994
20. Short Course on Modern Ship Production and Ship Repair,
MIT, summer 1996
21. Ship Production, Second Edition, Richard Storch et al,
SNAME, 1995
22. Practical Ship Design, David Watson, 1998
23. Ship Design and Construction, Thomas Lamb, SNAME, 2003
24. Welding Mechanization and Automation in Shipbuilding
Worldwide, Richard Boekholt, 1996
25. Product Oriented Design and Construction (PODAC) Cost
Model Development, Howard Bunch, University of Michigan,
May 1995
26. DD-21 Cost Estimate: Cost Approach Methodology, SC 21
Program Office, June 1997
106
27. "Evolution of US Naval Surface Combatant
Acquisition Policies", John Hootman et
Transactions, 2004
Design and
al, SNAME
107
